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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

ROYAL VONPUCKETT,

Supreme Court No. 47074-2019
Ada Case No. CV-OC-1995-02445D
Ada Case No. CV-OC-1995-30747

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
SHARON KAY SMITH nka SHARON KAY
BERGMANN,
Defendant/Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT DIVISION OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT FOR ADA COUNT

HONORABLE JASON SCOTT
District Judge, presiding

Ronald L. Swafford, Esq.·
Swafford Law, P.C.
67 5 S. Woodruff A venue
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
Telephone: 208-524-4002
Fax: 208-524-4131
Email: office~swaffordlaw.com

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 1

Vernon K. Smith, Esq.
1900 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83702
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
Telephone: 208-345-1125
Fax: 208-345-1129
Email: vkslaw@live.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL .............................................................................................................................. 3
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................................................... 4
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ....................................................................................... 4
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................................................................... 7
III. ............................................................................................................................................................................. 8

A. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN SETTING ASIDE SHERIFF'S
SALE .................................................................................................................................................................... 8

B. ADDITIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE SALE ..................................................................... 11
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................................................... 14

Cases
Fed Land Bank ofSpokane v. Curts, 45 Idaho 414,425,262 P. 877, 880 (1927) ................... 7, 10
Gaskill v. Neal, 77 Idaho 428, 433, 293 P.2d 957, 960 (1956) ............................................. 7, 9, 10
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, slip op. 45200 at p. 7 (June 28, 2018) .................................................. 7
Phillips v. Blazier-Henry, 154 Idaho 724, 272, 302 P.3d 349, 352 (2013) .................................... 7
Safaris Unlimited, LLC, a Georgia limited liability Company v. Mike Von Jones, Docket No.
44914 (2018) ...................................................................................................................... 7, 9, 14
Suchan v. Suchan, 113 Idaho 102, 109, 741 P.2d 1289, 1296 (1986) ............................................ 7
Tudor EngineeringCompanyv. Mouw, 109 Idaho 573, 709 P.2d 146, (1985) .................. 13
Statutes
Idaho Code§ 12-121 ....................................................................................................................... 3
Idaho Code Title 11 ........................................................................................................................ 7

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 2

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Sharon requests this Court grant her attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho
Code§ 12-121. Under the totality of the circumstances of this bizarre historical case, an award
of fees and costs to Sharon would be reasonable, equitable, and required in the interest of justice.
Sharon has engaged in an extremely contentious, expensive and painful civil war with her exhusband, Vernon K. Smith, for over thirty (30) years, simply to receive her divorce settlement.
The record is replete with thousands of pages of appeals, hearings, notices, bankruptcies and
efforts to thwart Sharon's pursuit of her judgment again$t Vernon K. Smith. Mr. Smith, either
as a party and/or an attorney for a party, as in this case for his good friend and long time client,
Royal Von Puckett, has appealed each and every court decision in every case in which Sharon
has been involved. It is abundantly clear that the Sheriffs Sale which is at issue in this matter
was done under the name of Royal Von Pucket to allow Vernon K. Smith an avenue to be
assigned Sharon's judgments against Vernon K. Smith. The sheriffs sale set up by Vernon K.
Smith, attorney for Royal Von Pucket, was so substantially and legally flawed that the trial court
was left without any option but to set aside the sheriffs sale of November 13, 2014. But as is
true to form and action, Vernon K. Smith, through the guise and permission of Royal Von
Pucket, continued this pattern of frivolous and unsubstantiated legal tactics i.e., this appeal.
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ARGUMENT

!
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This matter has been ongoing since 1995 and is yet another case added to the long list of
additional litigation arising from the Smith v. Smith divorce action, CV-DR-1990-12684. The
Judgment in this matter was entered against the respondent (Sharon K. Smith nka Sharon K.
Bergmann "Sharon") in favor of appellant (Royal Von Puckett "Puckett") who was and is a long
term client and friend of Vernon K. Smith, the ex-husband of Sharon and the attorney for
Puckett. The Judgment in this matter has been renewed on a number of occasions over the years.
On October 8, 2014, a Writ of Execution was issued in favor of Puckett against Sharon. (R. 39)
On November 13, 2014, a Sheriff's Sale was held, pursuant to the Writ of Execution and
instructions from Puckett. (R. 85-91) The Sheriff's Sale was held on November 13, 2014 and a
Certificate of Sale For Personal Property Sold Under Writ of Execution was issued on November
24, 2014. (R. 40 and 41). On November 14, 2014, appellant assigned the "Judgment" sold

at the Sheriff's sale on November 13, 2014 to his attorney Vernon K. Smith. (R. 222, last
line of that page)
Thereafter:
1.

December 22, 2014: Respondent filed her Motion to Set Aside Sheriff's Sale,
Affidavit of Sharon Kay Bergmann In Support of Motion to Set Aside Sheriffs Sale
and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Sheriff's Sale. (R. 47, 49 and
52)
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2.

January 5, 2015: Appellant filed his Response and Objection to Defendant's Motion
to Set Aside Sheriff's Sale and Affidavit of Vernon K. Smith In Support of Response
and Objection to Motion to Set Aside Sheriff's Sale. (R. 61 and 76)

3. January 16, 2015: Respondent filed her Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of
Motion to Set Aside Sheriff's Sale on January 16, 2015. (R. 202)
4. January 20, 2015: Appellant filed his Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Sheriff's Sale. (R. 213)
5. February 4, 2015: Appellant filed his Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Further
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Set Aside
Sheriff's Sale. (R. 232)
6. February 4, 2015: Respondent filed her Supplemental Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Set Aside Sheriff's Sale. (R. 283)
7. February 4, 2015: Respondent filed her Affidavit of Larren K. Covert, Esq., in
Supp01i of Motion to Set Aside Sheriff's Sale.
8. February 6, 2015: The Honorable Jason D. Scott entered his Memorandum Decision
and Order Granting Motion To Set Aside Sheriff's Sale. (R. 466)
9. February 9, 2015: Respondent filed her Additional Supplemental Memorandum Of
Law In Support Of Motion To Set Aside Sheriff's Sale. (R. 474)
10. February 9, 2015: Appellant filed his Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of
Larren K. Covert, Esq., Filed in Supp011 of Motion and Supplemental Memorandum
to Set Aside Sheriff's Sale. (R. 4 79)
11. February 10, 2015: Appellant filed his Affidavit Of Vernon K. Smith in Support Of
Motion To Strike Portions Of The Affidavit of Larren K. Covert. (R. 486)
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12. February 13, 2015: Appellant filed his Affidavit of Vernon K. Smith for
Computation of Judgment Amounts Owing for Inclusion in Writ of Execution (R.
500)
13. February 19, 2015: Appellant filed his Motion for Reconsideration. (R. 507)
14. February 20, 2015: Appellant sought and received a second Writ of Execution. (R.
512)
15. March 20, 2015: Appellant filed a second Notice of Sheriffs Sale. The second sale
was set for April 2, 2015. (R. 514)
16. March 31, 2015: Sharon filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. (R. 712)
17. January 4, 2016: Judge Pappas enters a Corrected Order Confirming Chapter 13 Plan
filed June 17, 2015. Page 3, paragraph F of that Order specifically retained as part of
the bankruptcy estate of Sharon, the two judgments entered in Smith v. Smith, CVDR-1990-2684, in favor of Sharon against Vemon K. Smith. (R. 716)
18. March 11, 2019: Puckett files his Notice of Relief From Stay entered in Sharon's
Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding.
19. April 12, 2019: The District Court enters its Order Denying Motion to Reconsider.

(R. 824)
20. May 24, 2019: Appellant files his Notice of Appeal. (R. 828)
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II
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Whether to set aside an execution sale lies largely within the trial court's discretion"
Phillips v. Blazier-Henry, 154 Idaho 724,272, 302 P.3d 349, 352 (2013) quoting Suchan v.
Suchan, 113 Idaho 102, 109, 741 P.2d 1289, 1296 (1986)

"Each case depends largely on its own peculiar facts; and whether the circumstances,
coupled with the inadequacy of price, are sufficient to warrant setting aside the sale is a matter
largely within the discretion of the trial court." Id quoting Gaskill v. Neal, 77 Idaho 428,433,
293 P.2d 957, 960 (1956)
"This Court evaluates whether the district court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one
of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with
relevant legal standards; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Lunneborg v. My
Fun Life, slip op. 45200 at p. 7 (June 28, 2018).

Title 11 of the Idaho Code enumerates the particular requirements governing sheriff
sales. The requirements of Title 11 evidence the twin aims of compensating the judgment
creditor while simultaneously protecting the judgment debtor from overreaching. Safaris
Unlimited, LLC, a Georgia limited liability Company v. Mike Von Jones, Docket No. 44914

(2018). (emphasis added)
The "general rule" that governs whether a sheriffs sale should be vacated is as follows:
"mere inadequacy of consideration is not sufficient grounds for setting aside a sheriffs sale, but
it is uniformly held that "gross inadequacy of consideration," coupled with very slight additional
circumstances is sufficient." Fed. Land Bank ofSpokane v. Curts, 45 Idaho 414,425,262 P.
877, 880 (1927).
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III.

A.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN SETTING ASIDE
SHERIFF'S SALE

The November 13, 2014 Sheriff's sale purported to sell the "Judgment" Sharon holds
against Ve1non K. Smith in case CV-DR-1990-12684. As a result of the failure of Puckett
to adequately identify the personal property to be sold at the Sheriff's Sale on November 13,
2014 (as will be discussed below), the actual item of purported "personal property" sold
cannot be ascertained. It must be noted, with further discussion below, that Sharon has two
judgments against Vernon K. Smith in Case No. CV-DR-1990-12684. The first judgment
was entered on February 11, 1991, for the sum of $194,936.13 plus interest at the rate of
13.25% per annum (R. 588) and the second judgment was entered on January 6, 1999, in the
sum of $31,770.16 at the rate of 10.50% per annum. (R. 605) The Sheriff's sale of the
"Judgment" [singular] on November 13, 2014, could only have been for one of the two
judgments for which approximately $1,000,000.00 and$94,000.00, respectively, are owing.
The Sheriff's Return on Writ of Execution sets out the results of the sale of the
"Judgment" on November 13, 2014. In this document, the Sheriff lists $187.17 in Sheriff's
Fees and $10. 00 for a recording fee. This gives a total for the sheriff's fees in the amount of
$197 .17. The amount paid at the sale was a $100. 00 credit bid by Puckett. With this being
the only amount noted for the sale, the Sheriffs sale in this matter resulted in a net negative
loss of $97 .17 to Sharon thereby increasing the judgment debt due by Sharon to Puckett
from $175,294.89 to $175,392.06. (R. 101)
The Trial Court specifically found as to the value of the property sold:
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"Several years after the Court's decision was issued, the Idaho Supreme Court
issued an opinion to the effect that, when a district court relies on price
inadequacy in setting aside a sheriff's sale, it must make a factual finding as
to the value of the property sold." Safaris Unlimited, LLC v. Jones, 163
Idaho 874, 886, 421 P.3d 205, 217 (2018)
"As a general matter, that's a reasonable requirement. Here, however, no
such finding should be required (and none is being made). As already
explained, Smith's judgment debt increased because of the sheriff's sale, as
the winning bid was smaller than the sheriff's fees, which are added to the
judgment debt. This anomalous outcome - the judgment debtor owing even
more money after the sheriff's sale- justifies-a finding that the sale price was
grossly inadequate as a matter of law, no matter what the property sold is
worth. That property couldn't possibly have been worth less than nothing, yet
less than nothing is what Smith received for it. Any way you slice it, that's
gross inadequacy.''
(R. 825, footnote 1)
The Trial Court therefore concluded that the sale price was grossly inadequate and
that this price inadequacy, when coupled with the discussed additional circumstances
(below) provides an additional justification for setting aside the sheriff's sale. (R. 825,
footnote 1)
In addition, and critical to this case's compliance with the requirements of Safaris

Unlimited, LLC, supra, there was not a readily and fully identifiable item of personal
property for which the Trial Court could make a finding of value. If the personal property
cannot be identified with any certainty or specificity, there certainly cannot be a
determination nor finding of value. The Trial Court made the only finding it could as to
the value of the "property" sold at the November 13, 2014, Sheriff's sale as a result of the
record before it.
This Court has considered the standard of gross inadequacy of consideration in
previous decisions. In the Gaskill case, a sheriff's sale was conducted on two parcels of
real property. At the sale, the two parcels were purchased for the combined price of
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$426.12 including fees. Gaskill at $433,960.00. It was undisputed that the two parcels of
property in that case were valued at $11,000.00. Id. The Supreme Court held that the price
paid at the sale was grossly inadequate, and when combined with other factors, was
sufficient to set aside the sale. Id In the Gaskill case, the percentage of the amount paid
for the property was 3.65% of its value.
In the case of Federal Land Bank ofSpokane v. Curts, supra the issue of an
inadequate consideration at the sale was examined by the Supreme Court. In Curts, the
sheriff's sale sold 240 acres of property to a single bidder for $300.00. Curts at 880. This
property was worth at least $8,700.00 by virtue of another bid, though not accepted by
the sheriff, as determined by the Court. The Supreme Court held that this amount of the
sale was grossly inadequate and shocked the conscience ofthe court. Id at 881. In the
Curts case, the purchase price was 3.45% of its value.

In this case, the purchase price at the sale should "shock the conscience" of this
Court as well though realizing it is not the standard for review in this matter. For
argument sake, if the "property" sold at the sheriff's sale was the lesser of the two
judgments, the purchase price, before deduction of the Sheriff's fees, is approximately
0.001% of the value of the property. This is one thousandth of a percent. If the property

sold was the greater of the two judgments, the purchase price, before ~eduction of the
Sheriff's fees, is approximately 0.0001 %, or one ten thousandth of a percent of the

value. Either of these amounts are substantially more than the other two cases where this
Court determined the consideration to be grossly inadequate.
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While case law on this topic states that as "a general rule", the mere inadequacy
of consideration is not sufficient grounds to set aside a sheriff's sale, argument can
clearly be made that this case does not fit into the "general rule."
B.
ADDITIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE SALE
On October 8, 2014 (and recorded on October 23, 2014) Vernon K. Smith attorney
for Puckett had a Writ ofExecution and Notice ofLevy Under Writ ofExecution issued in
this matter. (R. 82 and 85) The Notice ofLevy read as follows:
"NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that under and by virtue of a Writ of
Execution issued out of the above entitled Court in the above entitled action,
of which the annexed Writ is a true copy, I have this day attached and levied
upon the right, title, claim, interest and Judgment Creditor rights of Sharon K.
Smith, formally known as Novotny, Moore and now known as Bergmann, and
in particular, as said Defendant is described with such personal property, to
wit:
THAT PERSONAL PROPERTY INTEREST PRESENTLY CLAIMED BY
SAID SHARON K. SMITH, AS A JUDGMENT CREDITOR, IN THAT
CERTAIN JUDGMENT SHE HOLDS WHEREIN SHE IS IDENTIFIED
AND NAMES AS THE PLAINTIFF THEREIN, AND HER FORMER
HUSBAND VERNON K. SMITH, IS NAMED AND IDENTIFIED AS THE
DEFENDANT THEREIN, CASE NO. CV-DR-1990-12684." (emphasis
added)
The Notice ofSheriff)s Sale (R. 97) contained the same description of the personal
property as the Writ) as follows:
NOTICE OF SHERIFF'S SALE
BY VIRTUE of a Writ of Execution in my hands, issued out of the District
Court of the Fourth Judicial District, of the State of Idaho, in and for the
County of Ada in the suit of ROYAL VON PUCKETT against SHARON K.
SMITH formerly known as Sharon K. Novotny CVOC9502445D duly
attested 10/08/20147, I have levied upon all the right, title and interest of the
said judgment debtor in and to the following described property, situated in
Ada County, Idaho, viz:
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THAT PERSONAL PROPERTY INTEREST PRESENTLY CLAIMED BY
SAID SHARON K. SMITH, AS A JUDGMENT CREDITOR, THAT
CERTAIN IBDGMENT SHE HOLDS WHEREIN SHE IS IDENTIFIED
AND NAMED AS THE PLAINTIFF THEREIN, AND HER FORMER
HUSBAND VERNON K. SMITH, IS NAMED AND IDENTIFIED AS THE
DEFENDANT THEREIN, CASE NO. CV-DR-1990-12684" (emphasis
added)
The Certificate ofSale for Personal Property Sold Under Writ ofExecution (R.
99), contained the same description of the personal property as the Writ and Notice of

Levy, as follows:
"NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that under and by virtue of a Writ of
Execution issued out of the above entitled Court in the above entitled action,
of which the annexed Writ is a true copy, I have this day attached and levied
upon the right, title, claim, interest and Judgment Creditor rights of Sharon K.
Smith, formally known as Novotny, Moore and now known as Bergmann, and
in particular, as said Defendant is described with such personal property, to
wit:
THAT PERSONAL PROPERTY INTEREST PRESENTLY CLAIMED BY
SAID SHARON K. SMITH, AS A JUDGMENT CREDITOR, IN THAT
CERTAIN IBDGMENT SHE HOLDS WHEREIN SHE IS IDENTIFIED
AND NAMES AS THE PLAINTIFF THEREIN, AND HER FORMER
HUSBAND VERNON K. SMITH, IS NAMED AND IDENTIFIED AS THE
DEFENDANT THEREIN, CASE NO. CV-DR-1990-12684." (emphasis
added)
The first circumstance allowing the sale to be set aside is the fact that there is
no clear indication as to what was actually placed for sale and sold by the Sheriff. As
noted above, the description of the property levied by the Sheriff was inadequate to
properly place anything in the Sheriffs possession to sale. The property is identified as
a "certain judgment," but does not give any specific identifying information as to
allow identification of that "certain judgment". As stated above, Sharon has two
separate and distinct judgments against Vernon K. Smith. These judgments were
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issued separately and have been renewed numerous items in separate pleadings. Both
judgments have been separately recorded and have never been combined.
The Notice of Levy Under Writ of Execution, the Notice of Sheriff's Sale nor
the Sheriffs Return of Service contain any additional or further information as to
identify the personal property the sheriff believes was levied and sold. Without
specific, identifying information, there cannot be a proper sale, as the property was not
and cannot be identified. The documents only describe a single "Judgment", and
therefore Puckett cannot now claim he levied upon and sold both judgments. Further,
Puckett cannot, after the completion of the sale, try to pick or choose which of the two
judgments was actually sold. The sale had to be set aside for failure to identify the
property with particularity and specificity.
The second circumstance of the sale is that Sharon did not receive actual notice
of the sheriff's sale prior to the sale being held. In the case of Tudor Engineering

Company v. Mouw, 109 Idaho 573, 709 P.2d 146, (1985), this Court held that not
receiving notice of a sale was a factor to consider in granting equitable relief after the
sale. In Tudor, supra, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the notice of the sale in that
case had been conducted pursuant to I.C.§11-302. Id at 147. 576. However, in reviewing
the setting aside of the sale or granting an extension ofthe redemption period, this Court
noted that the property owners and interested parties had not been provided with actual
notice of the sale. Id at 148, 577. This Court upheld the trial court's decision to grant
relief.
In this case, the Defendant did not receive any notice of the sheriff's sale prior to the
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sale.
This is confirmed by the Affidavit of Sharon Bergman filed herewith. (R. 49)
Additionally, none of the documents filed in this matter evidence Sharon being served with
any notice of the sale. As such, when combined with the gross inadequacy of the
consideration in this matter, the sheriff's sale was properly set aside by the trial comi.
In summary, when all these circumstances of the sale are combined with the gross
inadequacy of the consideration in this matter, the Sheriff's sale was properly set aside by
the Trial Court.
CONCLUSION

There is no valid argument that can be made by Puckett that the sheriff's sale held on
November 13, 2014, should not have been set aside. The outrageously shocking gross
inadequacy of consideration coupled with the substantial (not just slight) circumstances of the
sale left the Trial Court with no other option but to set aside the Sheriff's sale of November 13,
2014. The Trial Court was fully mindful and cognizant of the legal requirements/standards as set
forth in Safaris, supra and met all those requirements/standards based on the record before it.
Sharon requests that this Court affirm the Trial Comi' s Memorandum Decision and Order
Granting Motion to Set Aside Sheriff's Sale and Order Denying Motion to Reconsider.
DATED this 94½.

day of January, 2020.

?~~

RcWSWAFfo~·~

Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

gt,

day of January, 2020, I served a true and correct

copy of the foregoing document on the following by the method of delivery indicated:
Vernon K. Smith, Esq.
1900 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

D
D
D

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Designated courthouse box
Hand-delivered
~ Email/iCourt: vlslaw@live.com

((d~~

RONALD L. SWAFFORD, ESQ.
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
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